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Reference Books. New edition available. Enter pincode. Usually delivered in days? Forouzan Behrouz A. TrueComRetail 4. Frequently Bought Together. Data Communications and Networking. Fundamentals of Database Systems. Add 3 Items to Cart. Rate Product. Hi Friends, I just want to tell you that Data Communication is very important subject for a computer science students.. Most of the students know the overview of Data Communication but very few ones's know the essential working of the structure of Data Communication Ritesh Verma Certified Buyer Oct, This book explains almost every aspect of networking , all those who want to step into Networking , i would recommend you to go through this book first.

Very Easy to understand , with some real life Examples.

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Service of Flipkart need not to be Explained. They are just superb. Got this Delivered in 3 Days. Great book and easy to understand as compared to Tannenbaum. Flipkart Customer Certified Buyer , Shillong 1 day ago. PLCs are often used in place of RTUs as field devices because they are more economical, versatile, flexible and configurable.

This connects the supervisory computer system to the RTUs and PLCs, and may use industry standard or manufacturer proprietary protocols. Both RTU's and PLC's operate autonomously on the near-real time control of the process, using the last command given from the supervisory system. Failure of the communications network does not necessarily stop the plant process controls, and on resumption of communications, the operator can continue with monitoring and control.

Some critical systems will have dual redundant data highways, often cabled via diverse routes. The human-machine interface HMI is the operator window of the supervisory system. It presents plant information to the operating personnel graphically in the form of mimic diagrams, which are a schematic representation of the plant being controlled, and alarm and event logging pages.

In many installations the HMI is the graphical user interface for the operator, collects all data from external devices, creates reports, performs alarming, sends notifications, etc. Mimic diagrams consist of line graphics and schematic symbols to represent process elements, or may consist of digital photographs of the process equipment overlain with animated symbols.

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Supervisory operation of the plant is by means of the HMI, with operators issuing commands using mouse pointers, keyboards and touch screens. For example, a symbol of a pump can show the operator that the pump is running, and a flow meter symbol can show how much fluid it is pumping through the pipe. The operator can switch the pump off from the mimic by a mouse click or screen touch. The HMI will show the flow rate of the fluid in the pipe decrease in real time. The HMI package for a SCADA system typically includes a drawing program that the operators or system maintenance personnel use to change the way these points are represented in the interface.

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These representations can be as simple as an on-screen traffic light, which represents the state of an actual traffic light in the field, or as complex as a multi-projector display representing the position of all of the elevators in a skyscraper or all of the trains on a railway. A "historian", is a software service within the HMI which accumulates time-stamped data, events, and alarms in a database which can be queried or used to populate graphic trends in the HMI.

The historian is a client that requests data from a data acquisition server. The system monitors whether certain alarm conditions are satisfied, to determine when an alarm event has occurred. Once an alarm event has been detected, one or more actions are taken such as the activation of one or more alarm indicators, and perhaps the generation of email or text messages so that management or remote SCADA operators are informed.

In many cases, a SCADA operator may have to acknowledge the alarm event; this may deactivate some alarm indicators, whereas other indicators remain active until the alarm conditions are cleared. Alarm conditions can be explicit—for example, an alarm point is a digital status point that has either the value NORMAL or ALARM that is calculated by a formula based on the values in other analogue and digital points—or implicit: the SCADA system might automatically monitor whether the value in an analogue point lies outside high and low- limit values associated with that point.

Examples of alarm indicators include a siren, a pop-up box on a screen, or a coloured or flashing area on a screen that might act in a similar way to the "fuel tank empty" light in a car ; in each case, the role of the alarm indicator is to draw the operator's attention to the part of the system 'in alarm' so that appropriate action can be taken. They employ standardized control programming languages such as under, IEC a suite of 5 programming languages including function block, ladder, structured text, sequence function charts and instruction list , is frequently used to create programs which run on these RTUs and PLCs.

Data Communications, Computer Networks, and Open Systems 4th Edition

A programmable automation controller PAC is a compact controller that combines the features and capabilities of a PC-based control system with that of a typical PLC. By converting and sending these electrical signals out to equipment the RTU can control equipment, such as opening or closing a switch or a valve, or setting the speed of a pump. Some users want SCADA data to travel over their pre-established corporate networks or to share the network with other applications. The legacy of the early low-bandwidth protocols remains, though.

SCADA protocols are designed to be very compact.

Many are designed to send information only when the master station polls the RTU. These communication protocols, with the exception of Modbus Modbus has been made open by Schneider Electric , are all SCADA-vendor specific but are widely adopted and used. This has the key advantages that the infrastructure can be self-contained not using circuits from the public telephone system , can have built-in encryption, and can be engineered to the availability and reliability required by the SCADA system operator.

Earlier experiences using consumer-grade VSAT were poor. RTUs and other automatic controller devices were developed before the advent of industry wide standards for interoperability. The result is that developers and their management created a multitude of control protocols. Among the larger vendors, there was also the incentive to create their own protocol to "lock in" their customer base. A list of automation protocols is compiled here. OLE for process control OPC can connect different hardware and software, allowing communication even between devices originally not intended to be part of an industrial network.

SCADA systems have evolved through four generations as follows: [9] [10] [11] [12]. The communication protocols used were strictly proprietary at that time. The first-generation SCADA system redundancy was achieved using a back-up mainframe system connected to all the Remote Terminal Unit sites and was used in the event of failure of the primary mainframe system. Information was shared in near real time. The network protocols used were still not standardized.

Since these protocols were proprietary, very few people beyond the developers knew enough to determine how secure a SCADA installation was. Similar to a distributed architecture, any complex SCADA can be reduced to the simplest components and connected through communication protocols. In the case of a networked design, the system may be spread across more than one LAN network called a process control network PCN and separated geographically. Several distributed architecture SCADAs running in parallel, with a single supervisor and historian, could be considered a network architecture.

This allows for a more cost-effective solution in very large scale systems.

The growth of the internet has led SCADA systems to implement web technologies allowing users to view data, exchange information and control processes from anywhere in the world. SCADA systems that tie together decentralized facilities such as power, oil, gas pipelines, water distribution and wastewater collection systems were designed to be open, robust, and easily operated and repaired, but not necessarily secure.

For example, United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team US-CERT released a vulnerability advisory [22] warning that unauthenticated users could download sensitive configuration information including password hashes from an Inductive Automation Ignition system utilizing a standard attack type leveraging access to the Tomcat Embedded Web server. Security researcher Jerry Brown submitted a similar advisory regarding a buffer overflow vulnerability [23] in a Wonderware InBatchClient ActiveX control.

Both vendors made updates available prior to public vulnerability release. Mitigation recommendations were standard patching practices and requiring VPN access for secure connectivity. Consequently, the security of some SCADA-based systems has come into question as they are seen as potentially vulnerable to cyber attacks. SCADA systems are used to control and monitor physical processes, examples of which are transmission of electricity, transportation of gas and oil in pipelines, water distribution, traffic lights, and other systems used as the basis of modern society.

The security of these SCADA systems is important because compromise or destruction of these systems would impact multiple areas of society far removed from the original compromise. For example, a blackout caused by a compromised electrical SCADA system would cause financial losses to all the customers that received electricity from that source. One is the threat of unauthorized access to the control software, whether it is human access or changes induced intentionally or accidentally by virus infections and other software threats residing on the control host machine.

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In many cases, the control protocol lacks any form of cryptographic security , allowing an attacker to control a SCADA device by sending commands over a network. The reliable function of SCADA systems in our modern infrastructure may be crucial to public health and safety. As such, attacks on these systems may directly or indirectly threaten public health and safety. Such an attack has already occurred, carried out on Maroochy Shire Council's sewage control system in Queensland, Australia. Pumps did not run when needed and alarms were not reported. More critically, sewage flooded a nearby park and contaminated an open surface-water drainage ditch and flowed meters to a tidal canal.

The SCADA system was directing sewage valves to open when the design protocol should have kept them closed. Initially this was believed to be a system bug. Monitoring of the system logs revealed the malfunctions were the result of cyber attacks. Investigators reported 46 separate instances of malicious outside interference before the culprit was identified.

The attacks were made by a disgruntled ex-employee of the company that had installed the SCADA system. The ex-employee was hoping to be hired by the utility full-time to maintain the system. WG4 "deals specifically with unique technical requirements, measurements, and other features required to evaluate and assure security resilience and performance of industrial automation and control systems devices".

The malware is called Stuxnet and uses four zero-day attacks to install a rootkit which in turn logs into the SCADA's database and steals design and control files.